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Gagauzia: growing separatism in Moldova?
Kamil Całus
On 2 February, the regional authorities in Gagauzia - an autonomous region of the Republic of 
Moldova - carried out two simultaneous referenda. In the first, local residents were asked to 
declare their support for the country’s integration either with the EU or with the Moscow-led 
Customs Union (CU); the second referendum sought their opinion on the draft law “On the 
deferred status of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia”. Under the proposed legislation, 
if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty (for example, through the unification of Moldova and 
Romania, or even as some politicians have argued, through Moldova’s further integration 
with the EU), the autonomous region would automatically become the independent Republic 
of Gagauzia. As expected, the outcome of the vote has shown overwhelming support for both 
the CU and for the draft law. According to the figures released by Gagauzia’s Central Electoral 
Commission, 98.5% of the voters supported Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union, 
while 98% voted in favour of the ‘deferred independence’ bill. Support for closer integration 
with the EU was marginal, reaching just over 2%. Despite the one-sided outcome of the ref-
erendum, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the ballot was rigged. It should also be 
noted that voter turnout was very high, reaching about 70%. Representatives of the Moldovan 
Central Electoral Commission, however, believe that the figure may have been artificially in-
flated by excluding many of the voters currently residing abroad from the count.
The primary reasons for such an unambiguously 
one-sided result are: the traditionally pro-Russian 
attitude of the local population; a fear of the po-
tential unification of Moldova and Romania (fu-
elled by local officials and compounded by state-
ments released by Bucharest); a fear of a further 
drop in trade with Russia and restrictions on ac-
cess to the all-important Russian labour market; 
and also poor knowledge about the European 
Union and the process of European integration.
The referendum was held in the face of pro-
tests from Chisinau and a declaration that the 
vote would be illegal. The region’s defiance was 
yet another manifestation of the long-standing 
crisis between Chisinau and the Autonomous 
Region of Gagauzia. This has been caused by 
a number of factors, including: the struggle for 
power on the Gagauz political scene; the tussle 
between central and regional government over 
the degree of autonomy as well as the amount 
and the distribution of funding; and Russia’s 
interference aimed at stoking separatist senti-
ment in the region. Moldova’s decision to initial 
an association agreement with the EU in No-
vember 2013, which is expected to be officially 
signed in the second half of this year, became 
a catalyst for the current crisis. The problems 
in Gagauzia are just one of a number of in-
struments which Russia has used to dissuade 
Moldova from signing the document. Moscow 
hopes to destabilise the situation in Moldova 
and to cause the collapse of the pro-European 
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coalition government and thus help bring 
Moldova’s Communist Party back to power.
Despite the complicated relations between 
Chisinau and Gagauzia, it seems that there is 
little danger that the region may become dan-
gerously unstable and force Moldova to change 
its current geopolitical course. The region is too 
small, sparsely populated, and too weak eco-
nomically to muster enough leverage to put 
sufficient pressure on the central government. 
The most prominent political leaders in the re-
gion have been using separatist and pro-Russian 
slogans, both to mobilise their electorate and as 
a bargaining chip in negotiations with Chisinau. 
Importantly, the results of the February referen-
dum (in combination also with other measures) 
are likely to be used by Russia and by the Mol-
dovan Communists in an attempt to undermine 
the country’s pro-European foreign policy.
Key features of the Autonomous Region 
of Gagauzia
The Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia 
(Unitatea teritorială Autonomă Găgăuzia) is 
a special administrative region in southern Mol-
dova, with a population of about 160,000 peo-
ple (or 4.5% of Moldova’s total population). The 
region’s main ethnic group are the Gagauz - an 
Orthodox Christian, Turkic-speaking people of 
Turkish or Bulgarian origin1, who have been liv-
ing in the area for about two centuries. The re-
gion’s total area is very small - around 1,830 km2, 
which represents just 5% of Moldova’s total ter-
ritory. Gagauzia does not constitute a uniform 
and compact territorial unit, and under cur-
rent law it includes all areas of Moldova where 
the Gagauz make up more than half the pop-
ulation, as well as those parts of the country 
which have opted to join the Gagauzia by refer-
1 There are a number of theories regarding the origin of 
the Gagauz people, but due to the lack of written sourc-
es none of them can be verified. The Gagauz are most 
commonly considered to be the descendants of medie-
val Turkic tribes (Uz or Oghuz), Seljuk Turks or ‘Turkified’ 
Bulgarians, although some scholars see them as ‘Turki-
fied’ Greeks.
endum2. As a result, the boundaries of Gagauz-
ia have undergone several small revisions since 
the region was officially established in 1994. It 
currently consists of four separate areas (see 
Map), with just three cities between them: the 
capital of Gagauzia, Comrat and Ceadîr-Lunga 
and Vulcăneşti, along with about 30 villages.
Gagauzia did not enjoy special status within the 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1990, fol-
lowing an increase in separatist sentiment, and 
due to fears that Moldova might merge with 
Romania3, MPs from the region announced the 
establishment of the Gagauz Republic, operat-
ing as an entity within the Soviet Union. Over 
the next four years, Gagauzia (like Transnistria) 
functioned as an unrecognised quasi-state. In 
1994, the local authorities reached a compro-
mise with the Moldovan government and offi-
cially recognised Chisinau’s authority over the 
region, which resulted in the formation of the 
Autonomous Region of Gagauzia within the 
borders of the Republic of Moldova.
Gagauzia has its own ethnic symbols, a flag, an 
emblem and an anthem, all of which are used 
2 As a result of the referenda, Gagauzia includes the vil-
lage of Kirsovo, inhabited mainly by Bulgarians, the 
town of Svetlîi, dominated by ethnic Russians, and Fe-
rapontivka in which ethnic Ukrainians outnumber the 
local Gagauz population.
3 The Gagauz people tend to hold exceptionally strong 
pro-Russian and anti-Romanian sentiments. In their col-
lective consciousness, Russians are seen as the protec-
tors from external threats, especially those emanating 
from Romania. The people remain acutely aware of the 
particularly painful period of Bucharest’s rule during the 
interwar period across present-day Gagauzia, followed 
by a fascist regime led by Ion Antonescu during World 
War II. Moreover, Romania is still seen as the cause of 
the Moldovan-Romanian nationalism of the late 1980s, 
which sparked ethnic tensions in the region.
Gagauzia is exceptionally pro-Russian. 
In the collective consciousness of the 
Gagauz people, Russians are seen as 
protectors from external threats, espe-
cially from Romania.
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alongside Moldova’s national symbols across 
the autonomous region. It has three official lan-
guages: Gagauz, Moldovan (identical to Roma-
nian) and Russian; however, Russian is spoken 
most widely, while proficiency in Romanian re-
mains relatively low. The Gagauz Autonomous 
Region does not have its own Armed Forces, 
but it does have a local police force, which is 
fully subordinate to the General Police Inspec-
torate at Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Gagauz economy is quite weak and rep-
resents only a small part of the Moldovan econ-
omy. It is based largely on agriculture and in 
particular on wine production. Industrial pro-
duction does not play a significant role in the 
region and represents just 3.1% of Moldova’s 
total industrial capacity. The region’s main in-
dustry is food processing, alongside several tex-
tile companies and furniture makers. Gagauzia 
is considered to be Moldova’s poorest region 
and remains dependent on financial support 
from the central budget. The region’s budget 
represents only about 1.5% of Moldova’s total 
budget4 and only about half of it comes from 
the taxes collected within the region. The re-
maining 50% of the budget comes from grants 
allocated by Chisinau.
Gagauzia’s political system
The basis of Gagauzia’s political system and 
its relations with Chisinau have been set out 
in three documents: the Constitution of the 
4 The budget for 2014 has been set at approximately US 
$30 million. Moldova’s expenditure in the same period 
has been forecasted at approximately US $2.1 billion.
Republic of Moldova, the Code of Gagauzia 
(seen as a local constitution) and the Law on 
the special legal status of Gagauzia. According 
to the above documents, Gagauzia is a special, 
autonomous territorial unit within Moldova’s 
borders, and as such, it embodies the right 
of the Gagauz people to self-determination5. 
Nonetheless, the documents emphasise that 
Gagauzia is an integral part of the Republic of 
Moldova. Until 2003, under the region’s stat-
ute and under the law on the special status of 
Gagauzia, the region’s government was given 
powers to declare independence in the event 
that Moldova loses sovereignty. However, the 
powers were de facto abolished with the in-
troduction of amendments to the constitution 
in 2003. The amended constitution considers 
Gagauzia to be a “constituent and integral” 
part of Moldova, while its land and resources 
have been identified as assets of the Moldovan 
people6. Although the provisions on the possi-
bility of secession included in other two docu-
ments constituting the legal basis for Gagauz-
ia’s autonomy have not been amended, they 
have in effect been nullified due to the primacy 
of the constitution.
Gagauzia has its own executive and legislative 
bodies. Its law-making powers are vested in the 
People’s Assembly (Halk Topluşu), which has 35 
members elected for four-year terms. The as-
sembly is responsible for drafting legislation rel-
evant to the functioning of the region, includ-
ing with regard to: the local budget, education, 
culture, social policy, and local administration7. 
All bills approved by the People’s Assembly 
must comply with the constitution and with 
the law on the special legal status of Gagauz-
ia. Any legislation failing to meet this condition 
is automatically considered null and void. The 
5 Act “Об особом правовом статусе гагаузии (гагауз 
ери)” dated 23 December 1994, Article 1, Section 1, 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, Article 111, 
Section 1.
6 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, 29 July 1994 
(reflecting amendments of 25 July 2003), Article 111, 
Section 1.
7 Act „Об особом…”, Article 12, Section 2.
Until 2003, Gagauzia was guaranteed the 
power to declare independence in the 
event that Moldova lost its sovereignty. 
The region was stripped of that right fol-
lowing an amendment to the constitution.
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People’s Assembly also has the right of legisla-
tive initiative in the Moldovan parliament and 
the right to participate in the implementation 
of Moldova’s foreign and domestic policy rel-
evant to Gagauzia’s interests8. The members 
of the assembly are granted immunity from 
prosecution within the boundaries of the au-
tonomous region. Following the 2011 elections, 
the current People’s Assembly has 25 indepen-
dent members. Most of them belong to New 
Gagauzia - a faction of the Democratic Party of 
Moldova (PDM)9 led by the mayor of Comrat, 
Nicolai Dudoglo - or to United Gagauzia10, led 
by the head of regional government Governor 
Mihail Formuzal. The remaining ten seats were 
won by representatives of the Party of Commu-
nists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM - 7), 
the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM - 2) and the 
Party of Socialists (1).
The executive powers within Gagauzia are 
vested in an Executive Committee headed by 
a governor, who - like the People’s Assembly - is 
elected for four-year terms by a direct major-
ity vote by the people of Gagauzia. The gov-
ernor represents the Gagauzia in Moldova and 
abroad, and is therefore an ex officio member 
of the Moldovan government with the rank of 
minister. In contrast to other members of the 
cabinet, a governor cannot be dismissed by 
the president at the PM’s request, and only the 
People’s Assembly has the power to remove 
8 Ibid., Article 12, Section 3.
9 The decision to link the organisation with PDM was tak-
en on 24 November 2012. The leader of New Gagauzia, 
Nicolai Dudoglo, who ran against Mihail Formuzal in 
Gagauzia’s 2010 gubernatorial elections, made no se-
cret of the fact that “New Gagauzia” needed the sup-
port of a powerful political party with national reach 
if its candidate was to stand a chance of winning the 




10 Due to a ban on establishing local political parties, there 
are no Gagauz parties in Gagauzia. Instead, most local 
politicians are members of local civic movements. Individ-
uals seeking a seat in the People’s Assembly, run as inde-
pendent candidates, and only later form factions, which 
are often also joined by members running from party lists. 
Consequently, the number of members in a faction may 
exceed the number of independent candidates.
a governor from office. The governor’s duties 
include signing or vetoing laws adopted by the 
People’s Assembly, and issuing regulations and 
directives. The governor also has the right to 
hold a referendum and to disband the People’s 
Assembly it is unable to approve the composi-
tion of a new Executive Committee.
The current crisis and its origins
The current crisis in the relations between Chisi-
nau and Comrat is the result of the confluence 
of three factors: political competition inside 
Gagauzia; disputes over the degree of Comrat’s 
autonomy from Chisinau; and Russia’s policy 
aimed at stirring up separatist sentiment in 
Gagauzia and triggering conflicts between re-
gion and central government.
On 1 October 2013, Governor Mihail Formuzal 
submitted a proposal to the People’s Assembly 
(PA) for a consultative referendum in Gagauzia 
to “determine the direction of Moldova’s for-
eign policy”. On 27 November, the members 
of the PA authorised the referendum and ad-
ditionally passed a draft law “On the deferred 
status of the Autonomous Region of Gagauz-
ia”11 that was also to be put to a vote in a lo-
11 The Bill does not introduce any major changes to the ex-
isting provisions in the acts that form the legal basis of 
the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia. The most import-
ant modification is the theoretically automatic change 
in sovereignty. Although local legislation previously also 
granted Gagauzia the right to declare independence in 
the event that Moldova lost its sovereignty, the new law 
automatically establishes an independent Republic of 
Gagauzia at the moment Moldova’s sovereignty is lost 
and without the need for approval by the Gagauz people 
or the region’s government. It seems, however, that the 
new rules can be lawfully implemented only after the loss 
of Moldovan sovereignty has been officially recognised.
The key political forces in Gagauzia are: 
New Gagauzia (a faction of the Demo-
cratic Party of Moldova), the association 
United Gagauzia, and the Party of Com-
munists of the Republic of Moldova.
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cal constitutional referendum. 2 February 2014 
was set as the date for both issues. It appears 
that the real reason behind the decision to hold 
the referendum was linked to a power strug-
gle between Formuzal (who is now serving his 
second term as governor) and the mayor of 
Comrat, Nicolai Dudoglo. The idea of  a refer-
endum being held on accession to the Customs 
Union has long had significant support from 
the Gagauz people. Already in December 2012, 
New Gagauzia called for a vote on the coun-
try’s geopolitical orientation. Nonetheless, the 
referendum proposed by the governor was not 
immediately backed by New Gagauzia12 due to 
fears that the voters could perceive support for 
the initiative as a success for Formuzal’s admin-
istration, which would be of no benefit to the 
governor’s political opponents. It was only af-
ter a failed attempt on 15 November to remove 
Formuzal from office that the leaders of New 
Gagauzia finally decided to support the refer-
endum. To make their own mark, however, they 
augmented the question with the populist idea 
to demand guarantees that would automati-
cally become an independent state if Moldova 
should lose sovereignty, for example by merg-
ing with Romania. This put New Gagauzia in 
a much stronger position and allowed it to pres-
ent itself as a promoter and initiator of the new 
referendum. The intense rivalry between Nico-
lai Dudoglo, the leader of New Gagauzia, and 
12 At the time, New Gagauzia argued that there was little 
point in holding a referendum on EU vs. CU integration 
in Gagauzia alone, and that such a vote should be held 
nationally.
Governor Formuzal is fuelled by the upcoming 
gubernatorial elections in the region, planned 
for late 2014 or early 2015. Dudoglo has made 
no secret of his gubernatorial ambitions, while 
Formuzal - who is prohibited from running for 
a third consecutive term - may need backing to 
secure a parliamentary seat in Chisinau.
It seems likely that the motivation behind the 
government in Comrat organising the referen-
dum was their attempt to strengthen its bar-
gaining power in talks with Chisinau, which 
would enable it to negotiate a better fund-
ing formula for the region. Gagauzia uses its 
threats to adopt pro-Russian policies as a bar-
gaining chip in local power struggles and to 
put political pressure on the government in 
Chisinau. This in turn, allows it to effectively 
negotiate the degree of its autonomy or the 
amount of funding it receives. Since July 2013, 
the regional government in Gagauzia has been 
trying to block amendments to the law on local 
public finance. Under the proposed changes, 
the revenues from taxes collected within the 
region would be significantly reduced: Gagauz-
ia would keep 25% of the income tax collected 
from individuals and 50% of corporate income 
tax, VAT and excise duty13. Currently, 100% of 
locally collected tax revenue stays in Gagauzia. 
The resulting gap would be filled via subsidies 
from the central budget, which would increase 
the region’s dependence on Chisinau14.
It is also possible that the growing political 
struggle in Gagauzia is being exacerbated by 
a rivalry between the two main political parties 
that form Moldova’s ruling coalition: PLDM and 
PDM. Formuzal is thought to be a political op-
ponent of Vlad Plahotniuc - the main sponsor 
and deputy leader of PDM, while at the same 
time being a supporter of PLDM leader and for-
mer Prime Minister Vlad Filat. The attempt by 
members of New Gagauzia (and by extension, 
13 http://www.kommersant.md/node/19159
14 Currently, subsidies represent about 50% of the region’s 
budget; if the changes come into force, this share will 
increase to 72%.
The crisis in the relations between Comrat 
and Chisinau stems from political rivalry 
within Gagauzia, as well as struggles over 
the degree of autonomy held by the re-
gion, and Russia’s policy, which seeks to 
stir up separatist sentiments in the region.
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of PDM) to remove Governor Mihail Formuzal 
from office on 15 November could be analysed 
in the context of a struggle for control over the 
administrative apparatus in the Gagauzia. For-
muzal’s departure, followed by a snap election, 
would most likely have seen Dudoglo take over 
as governor. Consequently, PDM would have 
been given a de facto monopoly on power in 
Gagauzia, which would have allowed it to use 
its clout to improve the Democrats’ chances in 
the parliamentary elections scheduled for late 
November. Finally, this would also have giv-
en PDM its own minister, whose appointment 
would not dependent on approval from the 
prime minister.
Russia’s activity in the region
Although the current crisis is the result of mainly 
domestic political rivalry, the tensions between 
Chisinau and Comrat have also been stirred up 
by Russia. The outcome of the Gagauz referen-
dum, which has shown a clear preference for 
closer integration with the Customs Union, has 
undoubtedly been welcomed by the Kremlin, 
which is seeking to destabilise the political sit-
uation in Moldova and to slow down, or even 
stop the process of Moldova’s European inte-
gration. Russia supported the plans for  a refer-
endum from the very beginning. In early 2014, 
Farit Mukhametshin, the Russian Ambassador 
to Moldova, said “this year, the embassy will 
pay particular attention to Gagauzia and Tara-
clia”15 which are seen as “positive role models” 
for the rest of Moldova. The voting process it-
self was monitored by Roman Khudyakov, who 
is a member of Russia’s State Duma and who 
later described the referendum as well organ-
ised and fair. On 2 February, shortly after voting 
ended, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry 
Rogozin welcomed the unprecedented turnout 
15 Taraclia is a region neighbouring Gagauzia, with a pop-
ulation of about 40,000 people and, like Gagauzia, it is 
predominantly pro-Russian. Ethnic Bulgarians make up 
the bulk of Taraclia’s population.
and said that the outcome of the referendum 
“must have made the supporters of European 
integration in Chisinau furious”. The media in 
Russia widely reported the Gagauz referendum, 
stressing that, contrary to the declarations made 
by government officials in Chisinau, opposition 
to EU integration was widespread among Mol-
dovans, adding that residents in other parts 
of the country had simply not yet had the op-
portunity to express their opinion. The reports 
also repeatedly suggested that if the Moldovan 
government continued to pursue a pro-EU for-
eign policy, the country would break up, or at 
least become politically destabilised. It should 
also be noted that due to budget cuts made by 
Chisinau the referendum in Gagauzia was bank-
rolled by Yuri Yakubov, a Russian businessman 
of Gagauz origin.
The central government’s position 
on the referendum
From the very beginning Chisinau strongly op-
posed the idea of  a referendum being held on 
the question of EU vs. CU integration. Under 
Moldovan law, foreign policy is the preroga-
tive of central government and may not be the 
focus of any referenda organised by Gagauzia. 
On 3 January, a court in Comrat ruled that the 
referendum would be illegal, but the region-
al government ignored the court’s decision, 
arguing that the ruling would not be final for 
another 30 days, and therefore not until after 
the scheduled date for the referendum. As a re-
The extreme outcome of the referen-
dum reflects the pro-Russian views of 
Gagauzia’s residents, the fears of a pos-
sible unification of Moldova and Roma-
nia, and concerns about the impact of EU 
integration on trade with Russia and ac-
cess to Russia’s labour market.
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sult, on 9 January, Prosecutor General’s Office 
launched a criminal investigation against the 
organisers of the referendum for alleged usur-
pation of power. 
In a last ditch attempt to prevent the vote from 
going ahead, the central government withheld 
the funds allocated for its organisation (about 
US $70,000). However, the measure proved in-
effective after Yakubov offered to cover the to-
tal cost of the referendum (see above). Finally, 
on 22 January, Prime Minister Iurie Leancă and 
President of the Moldovan Parliament Igor Cor-
man arrived in Comrat for a special session of 
the People’s Assembly. However, these discus-
sions also failed to persuade the region’s gov-
ernment to cancel the vote. Since then Chisinau 
has not adopted a tougher line against the re-
gion, although it continues to emphasise that 
the referendum had no legal force and should 
be treated as nothing more than an opinion poll. 
The opposition Liberal Party has been the only 
political body to officially demand that Gover-
nor Formuzal be removed from the cabinet.
Reasons for the success of the referendum
There have been a number of reasons for the 
extremely one-sided outcome of the vote and 
the high voter turnout. In addition to their tra-
ditionally pro-Russian views, the residents of 
Gagauzia also acted out of fear that Moldo-
va might indeed merge with Romania. In the 
months running up to the referendum, these 
concerns were fuelled by a series of unmistak-
ably pro-unification statements made in Bucha-
rest by Romania’s President Traian Băsescu16. 
The comments were then very skilfully used by 
both the region’s government and the Commu-
nist opposition to mobilise the electorate. In 
addition, the Gagauz people believe that Chisi-
nau’s pursuit of closer integration with the EU 
could translate into a drop in living standards 
in Gagauzia. Russia’s embargo on Moldovan al-
coholic products introduced on 11 September 
2013 affected primarily Gagauzia, where the 
agricultural sector is focused largely on wine 
production. Similarly, the potential restrictions 
on access to Russia’s labour market, which the 
Kremlin announced in the second half of last 
year, would affect the migrant workers from 
Gagauzia most acutely, as Russia is a key des-
tination for them (with only few Gagauz work-
ers seeking employment in the EU). In addition, 
there has been a profound misunderstanding 
of the very nature of European integration and 
a near complete lack of knowledge about the 
EU. This has been the case mainly because the 
government in Chisinau has failed to implement 
a coherent information policy and because of 
the relatively low popularity of Romanian-lan-
guage media in Gagauzia. Consequently, the 
people of Gagauzia tend to learn about the EU 
chiefly from Russian media reports.
The outlook for Gagauz separatism
It is unlikely that the situation in Gagauzia could 
in future become a serious problem for Chisi-
nau. This region does not have the sufficient 
political and economic power to be able to 
shape Moldova’s policy as a whole. Its only real 
bargaining chip is the threat of separatism and 
16 In recent months, Băsescu announced in a TV interview 
that following its accession to NATO and the European 
Union, Bucharest’s new major political project should be 
its unification with Moldova. The President also stated 
that if Transnistria’s and Gagauzia’s resistance were to 
threaten Moldova’s chance of EU integration, Romania 
would be duty-bound to restore Chisinau’s pro-Europe-
an course by unifying Romania and Moldova”. http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-12-04/
president-romania-supports-unification-moldova 
Splitting the region from the rest of Mol-
dova is not in the interest of the local po-
litical elites, who do not wish to emulate 
Transnistria, whose government is fully 
dependent on Russia and shunned by the 
international community.
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 129
the political support it receives from Russia. 
There is no doubt that the regional govern-
ment in Comrat will continue to capitalise on 
the pro-Russian and anti-Romanian sentiments, 
both to mobilise its electorate and increase its 
own support, as well as to gain the upper hand 
in negotiations with Chisinau concerning the 
degree of the region’s autonomy or its level of 
funding. This is likely to become particularly ap-
parent in the run-up to the elections. However, 
any real attempt to split the region from the 
rest of the country seems highly unlikely. This 
is because full sovereignty is not in the best in-
terest of the local political elite, who are aware 
that breaking away from Moldova would put 
Gagauzia in a position similar to that of Trans-
nistria, viz. of complete political and economic 
dependence on Russia, coupled with interna-
tional isolation. It appears to be more bene-
ficial to maintain the current status since this 
allows Gagauzia to win political concessions 
from the Chisinau government by capitalising 
on the pro-Russian sentiments of its people and 
Russia’s interest in the region. Gagauzia’s gov-
ernment’s policy of strengthening its position 
relative to Chisinau reflects Moscow’s strategic 
interests but, in contrast to Transnistria, the 
policy is not controlled or formulated by Russia, 
and the local leaders are seen by the Kremlin 
as players rather than pawns within its wider 
geopolitical strategy.
Although the results of the February referen-
dum have not been recognised by Chisinau, 
they will undoubtedly be turned into a propa-
ganda tool by the opponents of Moldova’s EU 
integration, both at home and abroad. There 
is no doubt that the issue will be used by the 
Moldovan Communists and by Russia to desta-
bilise the situation in Moldova, especially ahead 
of the signing of an association agreement 
between Chisinau and the EU, scheduled for 
September. It is also possible that Moscow still 
hopes that the Chisinau government will lose 
power, triggering a snap election. Consequent-
ly, the coming months might see attempts to 
hold similar “referenda” or opinion polls in oth-
er traditionally pro-Russian parts of the country, 
especially in Moldova’s second largest city (ex-
cluding Transnistria) - Bălţi. However, it should 
be noted that, should the revolution in Ukraine 
have a successful outcome, this would certainly 
improve the political position of the pro-Euro-
pean government in Moldova and reduce the 
strength of the arguments put forward by the 
opposition Communists.
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